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exports of protected firms. While antidumping protection raises the domestic 
sales of the more “traditional” non-exporting firms on the protected market with 
about 5%, it negatively affects the firm-level exports of similar products as the 
protected ones. Export sales of protected firms fall by almost 8% compared to 
a relevant control group of unprotected firms. The drop in firm-level exports 
more than doubles for firms that are global, i.e. firms with foreign affiliates. 
Measured at the product-level, extra-EU exports of goods protected by 
antidumping fall by 36% while exports to target countries fall by as much as 
66% following protection. Protection also affects the extensive margin of 
exporters but to a lesser extent. Initial exporters face a marginally higher 
probability to stop exporting during protection compared to unprotected firms. 
Finally, we find that the productivity of exporters falls while that of non-
exporters rises during antidumping protection. We offer a number of plausible 
explanations for our findings arising from the heterogeneous firm literature. 
We also discuss the importance of our findings for policy. 
JEL Classification: C2 and F13 
Keywords:  extensive margin, firm-level exports, intensive margin, 
antidumping, dif-in dif and productivity 
Jozef Konings 
Faculty of Economics and Applied  
Economics   
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven   
Naamsestraat 69   
3000 Leuven   
BELGIUM   
Email: 
jozef.konings@econ.kuleuven.ac.be   
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=126486 
Hylke Vandenbussche 
Faculty of Economics  
Université Catholique de Louvain & 
CORE   
Place Montesquieu 3   
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve   
BELGIUM   
Email: 
hylke.vandenbussche@uclouvain.be  
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=125478 
 
* The views expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the authors and do 
no necessary reflect the view of the European Commission. We thank Laura Alfaro, 
Mary Amiti, Maria Bas, Daniel Bernhofen, Paola Conconi, Maggie Chen, Joze 
Damijan, Ron Davies, Karolina Ekholm, Peter Egger, Eric Fischer, Wolfgang Keller, 
Ben Mandel, Phil McCalman, Thierry Mayer, Florian Mayneris, Mark Roberts and 
Chong Xiang.  We thank Ziga Zarnic for data assistance.. 
 
Submitted 12 June 2009 
 
 2
I. Introduction 
 
Rising protectionism is one of the greatest fears in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
that started in 2008. Despite a promise by the G20 leaders not to increase protectionism3, a recent 
World Bank report (2009) documented an alarming rise of 22% in the imposition of antidumping 
import duties in the course of 2008 compared to the previous year.4 While the upward trend of 
antidumping (AD) protection is not new and coincides with a process of general tariff reductions, in 
recent years there had been a slowdown in the number of antidumping cases which now seems to be 
reversed, as illustrated in Figure 1.5  
A likely explanation for the recent surge in antidumping is the presumption of policymakers 
that protection can be used for industrial purposes i.e. to safeguard domestic production, sales and 
employment at the expense of foreign imports. While this argument may partially hold in a world 
where import-competing firms produce and sell mainly domestically,6 results may be very different 
when firms are internationally oriented. 
This paper uses French firm-level and product data and shows that the effects of import 
protection are very different for exporting than for non-exporting firms. One of the striking 
differences is that while domestic sales by non-exporters of goods similar to the protected ones rise 
during protection, foreign sales by exporters in these goods drop drastically. To our knowledge this 
paper is the first to empirically document the effect of antidumping measures on the exports of 
protected firms and in doing so we aim to contribute to the growing literature on the effects of trade 
policy on heterogeneous firms.  
It is important to note that antidumping measures protect domestic firms that produce similar 
goods as the targeted foreign imports. To give just one example, when a European antidumping case 
involves the imports of say bicycles from China, we identify all producers of similar bicycles and 
collect their firm-level data including export values. Also important to note is that antidumping 
policy is an EU wide policy that applies to all European countries which will prove a useful feature 
for our empirical identification strategy in estimating the effects of the antidumping protection on 
French firms. Another useful feature of antidumping policy is the availability of a natural candidate 
for a control group of firms. A substantial number of antidumping cases involve firms that do not get 
protection. These are the so-called “termination cases”. Firms in termination cases constitute a 
                                                 
3 Paragraph 22 of the G20 leaders’ statement , London, 2 April 2009: “We will not repeat the historic mistakes 
of protectionism of previous eras”. 
4 Bown (2009) reports the more recent numbers and confirms a similar trend for the first quarter of 2009. 
5 In addition to AD, other more murky forms of protectionism are also on the rise (Baldwin and Evenett, 2009). 
6 The extent to which domestic producers benefit from antidumping protection depends amongst others on the 
extent of trade diversion (Staiger and Wolak, 1995; Prusa 1997; Konings et al. 1999).   
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natural counterfactual group of firms that share a number of similar properties with those firms that 
succeeded in obtaining AD protection but at the same time did not get protection.  
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Antidumping protection raises firm-level 
domestic sales of non-exporters by 5%. The beneficial effect of protection on domestic sales of non-
exporters is easily understood since a duty at the border increases the market for domestic goods at 
the expense of foreign imports. But for exporters we find that antidumping protection lowers their 
exports abroad by about 8% and this fall is not compensated by an increase in their domestic sales. 
The fall in exports may be explained by a set of reasons some of which may differ on a case by case 
basis.  
A first plausible explanation is that antidumping protection at home limits French exporting 
firms’ ability to lower their prices on extra-EU export markets. Whenever exporters price-
discriminate between their home market and abroad, they run the risk of being themselves charged 
with dumping practices. Antidumping protection at home may therefore limit their flexibility in 
terms of price setting in export markets thereby negatively affecting their export sales.  
A second argument is that antidumping protection tends to lower the volume of cheap 
imported varieties and keeps the prices of domestically produced import-competing varieties high 
(Prusa, 1997). Theoretically, it has been shown that AD can act as a collusive device aimed at 
aligning the low price of foreign goods on higher domestic prices (Zanardi, 2004 and Veugelers & 
Vandenbussche,1999). High domestic prices resulting from protection combined with the reduced 
ability of exporters to price-discriminate abroad are likely to reduce exporters’ competitiveness in 
export markets and to lower exports.  
A third likely explanation is that antidumping protection may adversely affect those 
exporters that outsource part of their production to the countries targeted by the antidumping 
protection. Outsourcing entails a fixed cost (Antras and Helpman, 2004; Grossman, Helpman and 
Seidl, 2005) which only more productive firms can cover. Since exporters tend to be more 
productive than non-exporters, exporters may engage more in outsourcing than non-exporters. 
Imagine a French exporting firm that outsources bicycle assembly to China for the purpose of 
importing these bicycles into France, while keeping activities such as branding, labeling and other 
types of distribution activities in France. French exporters that outsource their bicycle production 
face more expensive imports when they have to incur the antidumping duty imposed on bicycle 
imports from China which may negatively affect their exports. 
While our data do not allow us to directly measure outsourcing at the firm-level, we use the 
presence of affiliates abroad as an indication of a firm’s ability to engage in intra-firm outsourcing. 
About 10% of initial exporters in our sample have affiliates abroad as opposed to only 2% of the 
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non-exporters which suggests that access to a global network is an important difference between the 
two groups of firms. Firm-level exports of these “global firms” fall by 16% during antidumping 
protection which is substantially higher than the average fall in firm-level exports of all exporters of 
8% during that same period. Incidentally domestic sales of “global firms” drop by 22% compared to 
only a 3% reduction for “non-global” exporters. The results suggest that antidumping protection 
negatively affects all exporters both in terms of their exports and domestic sales but especially those 
that are likely to outsource.  
Individual case evidence both in the EU and the US suggests that the international orientation 
of firms or the lack thereof is what divides the domestic import-competing industries protected by 
antidumping policy as argued by Isakson (2007) for the EU7 and by Shapiro (2008)8 for the US. 
Both these studies discuss individual instances where antidumping protection was not well equipped 
to deal with the international fragmentation of production. Our empirical findings based on a wide 
range of cases seem to confirm this allegation. 
A fourth potential explanation for the fall in exports is that exporters may experience reduced 
market access abroad if domestic trade protection results in retaliatory action whereby trade partners 
protect themselves in turn (Prusa, 2001).9 Such retaliatory actions are difficult to capture empirically 
since they may or may not occur in the same sector and may take some time to materialize (Blonigen 
and Bown, 2003).10 Complementing our firm-level analysis with product-level trade data we show 
that while extra-EU exports across destinations decrease by 36% during AD protection, exports to 
target countries outside Europe fall by as much as 66%.  But despite the statistical significance, the 
economic significance of exports going to targeted countries is low. Exports to target countries 
represent only 1% of the total export value of products in our AD cases. This suggests that while 
                                                 
7 Antidumping protection on leather shoe imports from China was not supported by all EU shoe producers. The 
“globalized” EU shoe producers argued that they were harmed by the antidumping protection. Shoe outsourcers 
argued that despite the fact that they imported their shoes from China, more than 50% of the value added of their 
shoes was created inside the EU. Activities such as research, design, logistics, development and marketing 
involved most of the value added making the shoe a European shoe and not a Chinese one which should exempt 
them from paying antidumping duties on the shoes they imported from China but the EU Commission ruled 
otherwise. 
8 In a recent US antidumping case on “enriched uranium”, the Supreme court had to decide whether to install a 
duty on US outsourcers. Opponents pointed out that if the Obama Commerce department would use 
antidumping laws to punish outsourcers such a decision could raise costs throughout global supply chains. 
9 Lindsey and Ikenson (2001) argue that patterns of AD filings are consistent with retaliatory use. Prusa & 
Skeath (2005); Feinberg and Reynolds (2006) and Moore and Zanardi (2008) also confirm that new users of AD 
use it for retaliation. Retaliation is also singled out as a motive for AD law adoption by Vandenbussche and 
Zanardi (2008). 
10 Retaliation can take the form of petition against an industry in a specific country that has filed against the 
petitioning industry in the past. This is the most transparent form of retaliation. But it can also entail the filing 
against an industry in a country that has other industries that have filed petitions against industries in the home 
country previously. 
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retaliation adds to the fall in exports, it is unlikely to account for the majority of the decrease in 
exports.  
Each of the four explanations discussed above is likely to contribute to the reduction in 
exports that we observe as a result of AD protection. Which of the explanations applies is likely to 
differ case by case and it is not our purpose to determine their individual importance. These 
explanations identify different channels through which trade policy may adversely affect exporters 
suggesting that antidumping has not kept pace with the increasingly international orientation of 
firms. Our findings suggest that the beneficial effects for domestic producers usually associated with 
antidumping protection only appear to accrue to the more “traditional” firms without international 
activity. However, the world has changed and firms increasingly engage in international activities 
(Helpman, 2006) where the effects of trade policy are not well understood which is where we aim to 
contribute. Some of the stylized facts that we present are in line with the theoretical models on 
heterogeneous firms as discussed in section 2. Other facts may offer inspiration for new models to 
allow us to better understand what it is that firms do and how trade policy affects different firms 
differently.  
The effects of antidumping protection are very different for exporters compared to non-
exporters. In terms of initial conditions, exporters in our sample are typically larger and on average 
more productive  than non-exporters which confirms earlier results (Eaton et al., 2004; Mayer and 
Ottaviano, 2008; Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004). While the non-exporters in our sample 
experience a modest increase in firm-level productivity during protection, exporters’ productivity 
falls during protection. 
A likely explanation for non-exporters’ gain in productivity is the increase in their market 
size (Lileeva and Trefler, 2007; Tybout and Westbrook, 1995; Blundell et al., 1999).11 The loss in 
exporters’ productivity can be driven by several factors. One is that exporters' output drops faster 
than input factors adjust. Output typically responds faster to a change in market conditions than 
physical capital what may explain the reduction in exporters’ measured productivity. Indeed, we find 
that the capital intensity of exporters does not change significantly during protection.  
Also, according to the “learning-by-exporting” literature, a drop in exports would reduce 
learning from exporting and negatively impact firm-level productivity for exporting firms (De 
Loecker, 2007; Van Biesebroeck, 2005). The fall in imports that typically results from antidumping 
protection may also negatively affect firms’ productivity. Several papers have pointed out that 
                                                 
11 While Lileeva & Trefler (2007)’s analysis is on trade liberalization , its results can be transposed to the 
context of import protection. Firms that experience an increase in market size invest in productivity 
improvement which raises their productivity. Blundell et al. (1999) showed that an increase in market share is 
results in more innovation which is likely to result in productivity increases. 
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imports affect technology adoption which in turn affects domestic firms’ productivity (Rodrik 1992; 
Amiti and Konings, 2007).  
Our analysis is different from Kasahara and Lapham (2008) who analyze the “vertical” 
effects i.e. the link between protection of intermediate imports and exports of final goods that use the 
protected intermediate. Their analysis is one where protection on intermediates feeds through to final 
goods and undermines the competitiveness of final good exporters.12 The research question in our 
paper is different in the sense that we study the “horizontal” effects, i.e. how AD protection affects 
the exports of the protected import-competing firms. In particular, we study firms that produce 
similar varieties of products than the protected ones on which we do not know of any other study 
dealing with the same issue.  
Our analysis is also different from Bown and Crowley (2007) who analyze whether a 
country’s use of AD protection distorts a foreign country’s product-level exports to a third market. 
The effect of AD policy that we measure is likely to be a lower bound of the true effect as 
firms in our data are multiple-product firms. As an extra robustness check we therefore complement 
our firm-level analysis with a product-level (8-digit CN) one. Trade data on exports offer the 
additional advantage of exports by export destination. We will distinguish between intra-EU exports 
and extra-EU exports since EU antidumping policy is an EU wide policy. We find that the fall in 
firm-level exports is predominantly driven by the fall in product-level extra-EU exports. Export 
prices and domestic prices measured by the unit values of products do not seem to be significantly 
affected during the protection period but remain stable over time. The price stability of exports may 
be a reflection of several forces. As explained before, antidumping protection tends to reduce price 
competition on the protected market by keeping prices high while at the same time it limits exporters 
in the protected country in setting lower prices abroad since otherwise they would face dumping 
allegations by their partners. A possible explanation for the moderate effect that European AD policy 
has on domestic EU prices is the “Public interest” clause. In principle this clause prevents the EU 
from imposing AD protection if consumer interests - in the form of rising prices - would be hurt by 
it.13 Interestingly Liebman (2006) for the US, using disaggregated product-level monthly panel data 
for steel, also fails to finds a significant increase in U.S. steel prices after a safeguard was put in 
place by the US government but concludes that prices were more affected by business cycle 
conditions and industry rationalization than by the safeguard protection.  
                                                 
12 Other papers analyzing the “vertical” effects of AD are Hoekman and Leidy (1992) and Feinberg and Kaplan 
(1993). 
13 The EU argued that antidumping duties on shoes from China and Vietnam were justified given that the price 
of European shoes would at most go up by 1.5 Euros a pair 
(http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/pr230206_en.htm) 
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From the price stability that we observe it is safe to infer that the fall in exporters’ 
productivity that we measure during antidumping protection cannot be explained by a mere price 
effect. 
The methodology that we use is a difference-in-difference (DD) approach with firm-level 
fixed effects. We evaluate the effect of EU wide AD protection on French firms using a control 
group of firms that did not get protected. Our preferred control group is firms in termination cases.  
While termination cases involve different products and firms, they belong to the same broad sectors 
as the protected firms and therefore share similar sector specific characteristics and institutions. 
Another useful feature of using termination cases as a counterfactual is that this will generate more 
prudent estimates than any other counterfactual. When comparing protected firms with unprotected 
firms in termination cases, we may overlook a “filing effect” common to firms in both types of 
cases.14 If filing would already have a negative effect on firm-level exports, comparing protected 
firms to unprotected firms is likely to underestimate the true export effects. Therefore using firms in 
termination cases is likely to yield smaller estimates than any other control group and can be 
regarded as a prudent approach that offers a lower bound for the true effects.  
From a policy point of view our results are highly relevant. Currently antidumping laws 
almost entirely focus on the effects of dumped imports on domestic production but are silent on the 
link between protection and domestic exports.15 Our findings clearly show that while AD protection 
can be used to foster the interests of non-exporters, it hurts the interests of exporters. The negative 
externality of trade policy on exports is likely to have negative long-run effects not considered 
previously for any country using AD as an instrument to protect its domestic industry.      
In the next section we discuss related literature, section III discusses our data and in section 
IV we present the empirical methodology and results. Section V concludes.   
 
II. Related literature  
 
In neo-classical models of trade theory, imported goods are very different from exported 
goods and therefore these models are not well equipped to explain how protection of imported goods 
can explain a fall in exports of similar goods than the ones that are imported. An early model by 
Krugman (1984) with a representative firm and increasing returns, suggests that import protection 
                                                 
14 Staiger and Wolak (1994) have shown a “filing” effect of AD to exist on the imports side. 
15The diverging interests between domestic firms and export-oriented firms became very apparent in a recent 
“leather shoe” case. In 2006, the EU imposed import duties on leather shoes from China and Vietnam. The 
dumping complaint had been much supported by relatively small Italian shoe producers mainly selling locally, 
but was opposed by large and more outward oriented shoe producers in the EU. In the end reforms did not go 
through due to the lack of political support from the majority of member states.   
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can act as an instrument of export promotion. Import protection increases the home market size 
which results in an increase in home sales that allows a representative domestic firm to slide down 
its average cost curve. This in turn enables domestic firms to sell more and cheaper products abroad. 
However, our empirical findings clearly point in the opposite direction i.e. that exporting firms are 
hurt by import protection of similar goods than the ones they produce. Recent advances in 
theoretical work offer new insights into the factors at work and seem to be more closely related to 
our findings. One important insight introduced in theoretical modeling recently is that firms are not 
all the same. Models have gone from a representative firm to heterogeneous firms where non-
exporters differ from exporters. 
While models of monopolistic competition, increasing returns and firm heterogeneity have 
become workhorse models in international trade, they are less suited to study issues of trade policy. 
One reason is that its analysis in this setting is complex as shown by Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare 
(2009). Typically the analysis of trade policy in these type of models has been limited to the analysis 
of trade liberalization modeled as a change in the transport costs.16 Empirically it has been 
confirmed that a reduction in transport costs results in an increase in the number of exporters, the so-
called extensive margin and an increase in the volume of exports, the so-called intensive margin 
(Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008).  
Another insight incorporated in recent models is that import protection no longer tends to be 
unilateral but bilateral where retaliatory aspects have become important which was less the case 
twenty years ago.17 One example is the heterogeneous firm model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) 
where two countries export to each other and engage in reciprocal dumping.  
Arguably, one can think of antidumping protection as an increase in short-run trade costs. 
Transposing the results for an increase in short-run trade costs, the above models would predict a 
decrease in the extensive and intensive margin. Our empirical results appear in line with these 
predictions. Conditioning on the initial exporting status of a firm, AD protection substantially 
reduces the intensive margin of exports and has a small but positive effect on the probability of 
stopping to export which lowers the extensive margin for protected exporters compared to 
unprotected firms.   
However, most of the monopolistic competition models focus on the effect of trade costs on 
“between-firm” productivity effects and do not provide inferences on “within-firm” productivity. 
Recent models focusing on the “within-firm” level productivity effects of trade policy have further 
                                                 
16 Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) are amongst the few to actually characterize optimal trade and 
domestic policy in the Melitz (2003) model at least for the restricted case of a small economy. 
17 In 1980 there were 49 countries with an AD law, but twenty years later in 2000, this number doubled to 103 
(Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2008) 
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shown the differential impact of trade policy on firms (Acharya and Keller,2008; Bustos, 2007); 
Verhoogen,2008; Bas & Ledezma,2008; Syverson, 2004). Their findings suggest that trade 
liberalization is biased towards the initially high-productivity firms that become even more efficient 
after trade liberalization. Transposed to AD protection this would imply that we expect trade 
protection to yield efficiency gains for the initially lowly productive firms i.e. non-exporters and to 
result in efficiency losses for initial exporters which is confirmed by our empirical findings.  
 
III. Data 
 
An AD-case typically involves an investigation of the evolution of the volume of imports and of 
import prices from countries that are accused of dumping by the import-competing domestic 
industry. The dumping complaint is investigated by the EU Commission and can result in 
‘Protection’ or in ‘Termination’.18 If protection is decided upon, a final AD measure is imposed on 
the ‘dumped’ imports to protect all the firms in the EU import-competing industry. When the 
Commission decides to ‘terminate’ the AD case, the dumping complaint is rejected and the EU 
industry does not get further import relief.  
For the purpose of analyzing the relationship between AD-protection and firm-level exports, 
we use income statements of unconsolidated firms19, covering the period 1995-2005, obtained from 
a commercial database sold under the name of AMADEUS. This database includes information on 
various financial and economic variables, such as sales, employment, material costs, tangible fixed 
assets for European listed and non-listed firms. European firms in AMADEUS in principle do not 
report exports, with the exception of France, where firms also report export turnover. We identify 
3,695 French firms that operate in the same sector as the dumped products and that are affected by 
the protection. The protected firms include non-exporters and exporters. About 25% of all firms in 
our sample are exporters and their share of exports in total sales on average is about 26% with shares 
ranging between 0 and 100%.20 The frequency distribution of firm-level export shares of exporters at 
the start of our sample is illustrated in Figure 2. Less than one-third of the firms we consider and that 
are involved in AD cases, export. Of those that export, the sales from exports are on average less 
than one third of their total sales.  
                                                 
18In the U.S. many cases end in “withdrawals” by the complaining industry as shown by Prusa (1992). This is hardly ever 
the case in the EU where a “Termination” usually refers to a negative ruling by the EU Commission.   
19 Unconsolidated financial statements are similar to plant level information. In contrast, consolidated financial 
statements group together the information of several affiliates domestic and abroad.  
20 After dropping firms with missing variables i.e. operating revenue, employment etc., the share of exporters 
rises to 33% suggesting that missings occur amongst the smaller non-exporters.  
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In Table 1 we give an overview of all the new AD cases21 that were initiated in 1997 and 
1998 and for which we could retrieve all the variables from the income statements required for our 
analysis and for which AMADEUS gave us observations in the years before and observations during 
the AD protection. In total, our dataset includes 20 new22 AD investigations when we count by 
product group which corresponds to 57 cases when we count cases by defending country. For each 
case Table 1 lists the year of initiation, the corresponding 4 digit industry NACE revision 1, the 
average number of 8-digit HS codes involved, the year of decision, the average duty and the 
importing countries involved. We collect firm-level data for the firms in the French import-
competing sector based on the 4-digit NACE sector the product under investigation was classified 
in.23 In 12 of the new cases (by product group), the outcome of the case was protection.24 Under the 
Sunset Clause, AD protection stays in place for five consecutive years.25 Duties range between 10% 
and 67%, with an average duty of 30%. In 8 other cases (by product group), the EU Commission did 
not grant import relief, after which the case was terminated.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics of exporters versus non-exporters which confirm earlier 
findings i.e. initial exporters are larger both in terms of number of employees, turnover and assets. 
Furthermore we observe that exporters are more productive and have more foreign subsidiaries than 
non-exporters. 
 
III. Empirical Methodology and Results 
III.1. Antidumping Protection and Exporters 
III.1.A.   The Intensive Margin 
                                                 
21 ‘New’ implies that these cases were not subject to protection when the case was initiated. 
22 Table 1 lists 22 AD cases but there are two overlaps. i.e. more than one AD case falls into the same NACE 4 
digit sector. A first one is in sector 1720 and another one in sector 1752. We deal with overlaps in the following 
way i.e. in the case of 1720, both the first and the second case was initiated in 1997. In both cases the case was 
terminated so we classified both as Terminations. In the case of sector 1752, a first case was initiated in 1997 
and a second one in 1998. In both cases a duty was imposed. This led us to consider the firms in this sector as 
being protected from the first year after the case was introduced in 1997 since the investigation usually takes 
about a year. 
23 The NACE classification is a detailed industry classification used by the European Union with 622 different 4 digit 
NACE codes. 
 
24 AD protection usually comes in the form of a duty but in some cases price-undertakings were imposed. A 
price-undertaking involves a voluntary price increase by the alleged dumpers to offset the injury to the import-
competing industry (Tharakan et al, 1998). 
25 Cadot et al. (2008) argue that the worldwide probability of an AD case being revoked and protection extended 
was low before and around the time of the Uruguay Round (1996), which was also the case for the AD cases we 
considered in our sample..  
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To evaluate the effects of antidumping protection on firm-level exports, we pursue a difference-in-
difference approach on the exports of protected versus unprotected firms as given by the following 
equation: 
 
1ln _ _it i it itExports AD EFFECT YEAR Dummiesα α ε= + + +      (1) 
 
Where αi is a firm-level fixed effect; AD_EFFECT is a dummy that takes a value of 0 for the years 
before AD protection and 1 in the years during AD protection but only for the protected firms. In 
addition we also include a set of year dummies to control for common time effects that may affect 
the exports of both the protected and the unprotected exporters. The control group we use consists of 
the firms in the “terminations” i.e. French firms that in the same period of our analysis filed for 
protection but did not obtain it. One concern is that Antidumping policy may be endogenous.26 
However, we exploit the fact that AD policy is an EU wide policy which facilitates our identification 
strategy. Since trade policy is determined by all European countries the effect that French firms have 
on it is bound to be small. Moreover trade policy of the EU has changed a lot over time with the 
entry of the new Member states making the influence of individual French firms arguably even 
smaller.27 Hence, the exogeneity of EU AD policy for French firms seems reasonable.   
We start in Table 3 by estimating the dif-in-dif regression in equation (1) on the total set of 
initial exporters i.e. we only include firms that prior to the protection period were involved in 
exporting activity. Column 1 in Table 3 shows the results when using the log of real export turnover 
as a dependent variable where we deflated exports with a simple four digit producer price deflator. 
Ideally, we should use an export price deflator, but then we would require destination markets at the 
firm level, which is not available in our firm-level data28. From column 1 we note that AD protection 
results in a significant decrease in export turnover of about 8% on average over the protected sectors. 
One potential explanation for the decline in exports is that mainly “global firms” are negatively 
affected. We define global firms as firms with foreign affiliates. Indeed when we control for firms 
that have one or more affiliates abroad, we can observe their exports fall more drastically. The 
coefficient reported in column 2 of Table 3 suggests that exports of “global firms” fall by as much as 
17%. While we have no direct information of firm-level outsourcing activities, “global firms” are 
                                                 
26 Goldberg and Maggi (1999) amongst others have empirically documented the political economy surrounding 
protection. 
27 Disdier and Mayer (2007) use a similar argument. When studying the link between trade and public opinion 
they argue that an EU wide trade policy shock is exogenous to the public opinion of individual EU countries.  
28 We also experimented with using the export share in total sales instead as a dependent variable, which avoids 
the deflation problem. Export shares also declined after AD protection. 
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natural candidates for these type of activities. Firms that “outsource” goods and produce them in 
affiliates abroad for the purpose of re-importing them to France are particularly vulnerable to this 
type of import protection. Antidumping laws currently stipulate that they are aimed to protect the 
domestic producers of goods. French producers that have engaged in a fragmentation of production 
and engage in outsourcing activities may have little industrial production left in France although 
they may have kept activities in the final stages of the production process that require little if any 
transformation of the product but may entail a large chunk of the total production cost such as 
advertising, marketing, labeling and branding.29 Our data allows us to distinguish between the 
location of the affiliates in terms of intra- or extra-EU. When we consider “global firms” with only 
affiliates outside the EU, we find the effect of antidumping protection on exports to be much more 
negative which can be seen from column 3. This is what one would expect since AD policy is an EU 
wide policy and mainly affects outsourcers outside the EU. 
In order to know whether it the global status of a firm solely explains the drop in exports, in 
column 4 of Table 3 we only include the non-global firms. The effect of AD protection on firm-level 
exports is still negative and significant. This suggests that even those exporting firms that do not 
have affiliates abroad suffer from AD protection in terms of their sales abroad. The exporting firms 
included in column 4 may still include outsourcers but those that work with independent suppliers 
rather than intra-firm outsourcing. The results in column 4 may also just reflect that other channels 
apart from outsourcing can have an adverse effect on firms exports such as the inability of protected 
exporters to price-discriminate or retaliation issues.  
An explanation worth investigating is whether exporting firms substitute away their exports 
towards more domestic sales. If protection increases the domestic market size, firms that were 
previously exporting may suddenly find it more profitable to increase their sales at home especially 
since by selling locally they would save on transport costs. If this is the true explanation behind our 
observations than we would expect to see a simultaneous rise in domestic sales accompanying the 
fall in exports of the protected firms. Empirically however we fail to find support for that 
explanation. In Table 4 we report the results of a similar equation as in (1) but now focus on the 
effect of AD protection on domestic sales. Our results indicate that after antidumping protection sets 
in, domestic sales significantly drop for firms that are initial exporters (column 1, 2 and 3 in Table 
4). For “global firms” the drop in domestic sales is much larger than for the purely domestic firms. 
                                                 
29 Outsourcers argue that when more than fifty percent of the value added is created inside the EU, they should 
be exempted from paying antidumping duties. They argue that the EU should use domestic manufacturing costs 
and not domestic production to decide who pays and who does not pay the AD duty (Isakson, 2007). 
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In contrast, for traditional firms that do not export and that do not have affiliates abroad, 
domestic sales significantly increase with about 5% during AD protection which can be seen from 
column 4 and 6. Put differently, for traditional firms with most of their sales on the domestic market, 
antidumping protection appears to be an effective way to increase their market size and their sales.  
 
 
 
 
III.1.B.  The Extensive Margin 
Thus far we have focused on the effects of AD protection on exporters’ intensive margin. But 
a related question is whether import-competing protection alters the number of exporters referred to 
as the extensive margin. In the first two columns of Table 5 we report the results of a dif-in-dif 
analysis where the dependent variable is dummy with a value of zero if a firm does not export and a 
value of 1 when a firm starts exporting. Since including firm level fixed effects in a probit equation 
can seriously bias estimates (Woolridge, 2002, p. 483) we include instead a dummy equal to 1 for all 
firms that ever received protection (Ever_protection dummy) and equal to 0 for all other firms i.e. 
those in the control group. AD protection has a small but significantly positive effect on the 
probability to start exporting for those firms that were not initial exporters before the protection. AD 
protection raises the exporting probability by 3% compared to the unprotected firms. The expansion 
in domestic market size for the non-exporters resulting from the AD protection is a likely 
explanation for this observation. Domestic firms benefit from protection and can increase their 
domestic sales. This allows firms to spread their fixed costs of production over more units than 
before thereby reducing their average cost per unit and possibly also lowering their marginal costs. 
This increase in productivity brought about by the protection may be such as to allow them to incur a 
fixed cost of entering export markets after which they become exporters which was not possible to 
them before. 
 In columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 we look at the opposite question i.e. whether AD 
protection affects the probability of exporters to quit exporting. We report the results of a dif-in-dif 
analysis where the dependent variable is a dummy with a value of zero if a firm continues to export 
and a value of 1 when a firm quits exporting. The results are more mixed. Without the inclusion of 
initial-productivity, which we define as the labor productivity of exporters when a case is initiated, 
we find a positive but not a significant difference between the probability of export stoppers between 
the protected and the control group of firms. When controlling for initial conditions, the probability 
to stop exporting becomes positive and significant. Initial exporters under AD protection have only 
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about 1% more chance to stop exporting than unprotected firms. The effect of AD protection on the 
extensive margin is small especially when compared to the effect AD protection has on the intensive 
margin of trade documented in the previous section. Several reasons may account for that. 
Hysteresis in export activity is one possible explanation. Since protection is in principle limited to 5 
years, exporters may “hang in” there and despite lower volumes being shipped out still continue 
their exporting activity. Given that exporting initially requires a fixed cost to enter the export market, 
this explanation would be in line with the real option theory (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) observed 
whenever activities require a substantial amount of sunk cost outlays. Empirical evidence to date on 
exporting activity supports the hysteresis argument (Roberts and Tybout, 1997). AD protection at 
best only seems to have a limited effect on the extensive margin.30 
 
III.2. Antidumping and Product-level Exports 
To overcome some of the limitations of our firm-level data which typically involves their 
multi-product nature and the absence of export destination markets, we complement our approach 
with a product-level one where we turn to the 8-digit product level (CN) trade data available from 
EUROSTAT. We identify all product level flows which allow us to check whether there is a 
different response of intra- versus extra-EU exports. In principle, antidumping protection applies to 
the whole EU market. In that sense we would expect the effect of AD protection to have a different 
effect on intra-versus extra-EU exports. We would expect the fall in exports to predominantly occur 
on exports to markets outside the EU i.e. on extra-EU exports. While we do not have a firm-level 
indication of which volume of exports is intra-EU and which volume is extra-EU trade, we collect 
this information from trade data at the product-level.31 
The results of the effect of AD protection are listed in Table 6 where we show the results of 
the following dif-in-dif estimation 
 
1ln _ _kt k kt ktExports AD EFFECT YEAR Dummiesβ β ε= + + +    (2) 
 
Where subscript k refers to the product(s) in the AD cases and where we use products in 
termination cases as a control group. From the results in Table 6 we clearly see that AD protection 
has a strong negative effect of about 37% on the volume of extra-EU exports while intra-EU exports 
                                                 
30 This result is consistent with the finding of Feinberg and Hartigan (2007) that do not find robust evidence 
between antidumping filings and plant closing using a sample of 91 US firms. 
31 Product- level trade data come from EUROSTAT and refer to French intra- and extra-EU trade. 
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go down by 28%. This is in line with what we expected i.e. the fall in exports’ volume seems to be 
predominantly driven by exports shipped to destinations outside the EU. These results also indicate 
that the AD-effect measured previously at the firm-level, where we estimated the effect of AD 
protection to depress firm-level exports between about 8 and 24%, is a “lower bound” estimate due 
to the multi-product nature of firms. The results in Table 6 clearly show that when we look at 
product-level export volumes, the numbers are substantially larger with extra-EU exports going 
down by as much as 37%. 
When interacting the AD_Effect with year dummies we note that the effects on extra-EU 
export volumes tend to kick in especially in the first three years during protection.  
In Table 6 we also look at the AD effect on prices, proxied by the unit values as in Trefler 
(2004). It can be noted that internal EU prices proxied by intra-EU unit values as well as export 
prices appear to be pretty stable over time and do not show a significant increase under AD 
protection. As discussed previously this can be consistent with AD used as a collusive device where 
the protection aligns the prices of foreign imported varieties to the higher level of EU prices but due 
to the Public interest clause, prices in the EU itself do not significantly go up.  
A potential explanation for the decline in exports is that there are retaliatory measures taken 
by non-EU countries. To explicitly test for retaliation effects is difficult as explained before, since 
retaliation may not occur simultaneously. It can occur in a different sector/product than the protected 
one, or can occur in a different way than through trade. The most direct form of retaliation would be 
that countries targeted by EU antidumping policy, take measures affecting French exports in the 
same product to the target country. To test for this we look at product-level trade flows to target 
countries in isolation. A first observation is the existence of bilateral trade flows between the target 
country and France in the same product. In fact, for the products in the AD protection cases, there is 
a strong positive correlation between product-level imports and exports of 79%. However, in the 
bilateral relationship with target countries, the import volumes in these products always exceed the 
export volumes to the target countries. The results in Table 7 show that export volumes to the non-
EU targeted countries went down32 by as much as 66% which is greater than the average fall in 
extra-EU exports as shown in Table 6. But exports to target countries only represent 1% of total 
exports of AD products which suggests that while retaliation can not be excluded it can only be part 
of the explanation as to why exports of French firms fall.  
                                                 
32 Several target countries became member of the EU during the period of our analysis. When we include these 
countries in the group of target countries, we fail to find evidence of retaliation. This suggests that countries 
close to EU membership did not take any measures that adversely affected French exports towards them. But 
limiting target countries to non-EU members as in Table 3b suggests otherwise.  
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In the same Table 7 we also document the import volumes and prices. Product-level imports 
fall significantly as a result of antidumping protection which confirms earlier findings (Prusa, 1997). 
The average price effect appears limited with only a positive and significant price increase in the 
fourth year of protection.  
 
 
III.3.  Antidumping and Firm-level Productivity 
Now that we have established that import-protection seems to be detrimental for the export 
performance of firms we can turn to another related question. What happens to the productivity of 
exporters compared to non-exporters? This is an important question as there is by now a large 
literature showing that exporters are typically more productive than non-exporters and for some 
countries at least, there also seem to be learning effects from exporting. We start by first 
documenting the productivity ranking of exporters versus non-exporters and use a simple measure of 
labor productivity to test this by running the specification below: 
1
2 3
ln _
_ _
it i it
i it
real labor productivity Cap Intensity
Export Status Year dummies
α α
α α ε
= + +
+ +    (3) 
 
We regress the log of real labor productivity on Capital Intensity (Cap_Intensity) measured by the 
ratio of Fixed Tangible assets over firm-level employment, where we deflate capital by a country 
specific capital deflator33, and an export dummy taking a value 1 when the firm is an exporter and 0 
otherwise and year dummies. We check the robustness of our results by adding firm-level or sector-
level fixed effects. Results are reported in Table 8. In line with Melitz (2003) and Bernard and 
Jensen (1999) we find that the productivity of exporters on average is higher than the productivity of 
non-exporters. This can be seen by the positive and highly significant coefficient on the Export-
dummy which is an indication of the export status of a firm over time. 
Next, we analyze the effect of antidumping protection (AD_EFFECT) on the  productivity of 
exporters. As empirically shown by Konings and Vandenbussche (2008), AD protection can induce 
protected firms to engage in restructuring allowing especially the laggard firms to catch up in 
productivity, while frontier firms operating close to the technological frontier lose productivity.34 
Since exporters are typically more productive, they are more likely to belong to the group of frontier 
                                                 
33 Ameco data base, European Commission 
34 Ederington and McCalman (2008) have a theoretical model in which they show that the equilibrium response 
of firms to a trade shock is heterogeneous such that ex-ante similar firms end up being different. 
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firms. Here we expect that the effect of antidumping protection on productivity to be negative for the 
initial exporters. For this purpose we estimate the following specification: 
 
1 2ln _ _ _
_
it i it
it
TFP AD EFFECT AD EFFECT x Initial Exporter
Year dummies
α α α
ε
= + +
+ +     (4) 
 
Where αi controls for firm-level fixed effects and again the AD_EFFECT gives the average effect of 
protection across all firms. The interaction effect indicates whether the productivity effect of AD 
protection for initial exporters is different than for purely domestic firms. In what follows we use 
several productivity estimates ranging from a simple measure of labor productivity to the more 
sophisticated Olley and Pakes productivity measure to verify our results. 
In Table 9 the first two columns report results when using a simple metric of labor 
productivity. The third column uses total factor productivity computed from estimating a Cobb-
Douglas production function with input factors labor, capital and material costs using OLS, while 
the fourth column uses the Olley-Pakes method to compute TFP. For these two last measures of TFP 
we first estimate the relevant coefficients of the production function for each sector separately to 
take into account differences in technology between sectors before computing TFP at the firm level 
using these coefficients. For the specifications using labor productivity we also included the capital 
intensity as an additional control. In all specifications we find similar results. Extending the findings 
of Konings and Vandenbussche (2008), the effect of AD protection on productivity is positive and 
statistically significant. However, this is only so for non-exporting firms. The interaction of the AD 
effect with initial exporter status is always negative and larger than the direct effect of AD 
protection. This suggests that exporters’ productivity decreases during protection. This result is 
unlikely to be driven by price-effects as prices, proxied by unit values, did not change much after 
AD protection as shown in table 6.35   
 While the results in table 9 seem robust with respect to various measures of productivity, 
there may be some problems with hidden dynamics inherent to productivity. In particular, as 
Bertrand et al. (2004) point out if there is serial correlation in the error term then the estimated 
standard errors may be deflated. We therefore report in table 10 a number of robustness checks in 
order to deal with this potential problem. As in Trefler (2004) we report in the first three columns 
                                                 
35 Earlier papers i.e. Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), Tybout and Westbrook (1995), Head and Ries (1999), 
Pavcnik (2002) and more recently Trefler (2004) find that trade liberalization raises the productivity of domestic 
firms in developing countries. These results are not in contradiction with ours but deal with allocative efficiency 
whereas we consider within firm productivity.  
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results based on difference equations. By differencing we implicitly control for the unobserved firm-
level fixed effects. Furthermore, when differences are taken we avoid potential biases arising from 
first order serial correlation. We report second and third difference specifications in columns 1 and 2 
respectively. The results in Table 10 remain in line with the results reported in earlier tables. When 
we interact instead of an initial_exporter dummy, with the initial share of exports in turnover in 
column (3) of Table 10 we notice again that the interaction effect is negative and significant and 
larger than the effect of the AD protection dummy. In fact, column (3) suggests that the effect of AD 
protection on firm-level productivity is especially negative for firms that are intensive exporters. The 
AD effect on productivity turns negative when the initial share of exports in turnover is 60%. Finally 
in the fourth column we apply an approach suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) which collapses the 
treatment period into one period and the pre and post treatment period in another period. This 
implies averaging total factor productivity over these three periods and as a result our panel is 
reduced from a 10 year period to three time periods, pre-treatment, treatment and post-treatment 
period. We find again a negative interaction term between the AD effect and initial exporter status, 
although the magnitude of the coefficient is now lower.   
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzes the effect of antidumping protection on the firm-level exports of French 
firms protected by Antidumping measures. We find that antidumping protection affects the intensive 
margin of exports i.e. the amount of exports but leaves the extensive margin i.e. the number of 
exporters in the protected sector, relatively intact. The fall in exports is especially evident on French 
extra-EU exports. This fall in exports is not compensated by a rise in domestic sales since for 
exporting firms, domestic sales go down. The fixed cost necessary for entering the export market 
may explain why despite a drastic fall in the volume of exports during protection, exporting firms do 
not massively exit the export markets. In terms of productivity we observe a fall in productivity of 
exporters during antidumping protection.  
Several explanations may account for the results we find. First, a market size argument, where non-
exporters benefit relatively more from import protection in terms of market share than exporters. 
Second, exporters may face retaliation abroad when exporting to targeted countries. We find some 
evidence in support of this retaliation hypothesis. Thirdly, Antidumping protection tends to raise the 
price of imported varieties and helps to uphold the price of domestically produced varieties. Our 
results indeed suggest price stability of exports during the protection period. This may undermine the 
competitiveness of firms exporting domestic varieties that are refrained from setting a lower price in 
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extra-EU export markets in order not to be accused of dumping practices by others. And fourthly, 
exporters that belong to a global network and engage in the fragmentation of production can be 
subject to antidumping measures which raises their production costs and lowers exports.  
Our evidence further suggests that antidumping protection benefits non-exporters. Their domestic 
sales go up significantly during protection and their average firm-level productivity increases. These 
results shed a different light on the benefits of antidumping protection. In general, antidumping 
policy is felt to be a mechanism fostering the interests of domestic producers. This paper is the first 
to show that while this is true for those that predominantly sell locally, it is not true for exporters. 
Not taking the interests of exporters into account when deciding to protect a particular industry is 
bound to have detrimental long run effects which need to be considered before deciding to impose 
protection. These considerations are particularly relevant given the recent steep surge in the number 
of new antidumping investigations. In the first half of 2008, the figure was 22% higher than in the 
same period of the previous year. Expectations for the future are that countries will be tempted to 
use temporary protection even more to shelter their firms from the adverse affects of the global 
financial crisis that started end of 2008. Based on this paper it is safe to conjecture that that this 
would result in a substantial contraction of exports and of trade in general which is likely to go 
against firms and countries’ long run interests. Our dataset was too short to observe what happens 
when the protection comes off but clearly that is a question for future research. This paper should 
clearly temper policy makers enthusiasm to use antidumping as an easy way to improve domestic 
conditions.  
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Figure 1: Evolution of Tariffs versus Antidumping Measures 
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Source: The tariff data for 1980-2007 from UNCTAD TRAINS (WITS, 2009) which runs to 2007. The 
antidumping data are from the WTO and the Bown database.  
 
 
Figure 2: Initial Export Shares of Exporters 
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Source: AMADEUS, French firm-level data 
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Table 1: New Antidumping Cases Initiated by the EU between 1997-98 
 
Year of 
AD  
Initiation 
Product 
# HS  
per  
case 
NACE  
rev.1 Decision (Duty/ 
Undertak/Termination) 
Year of  
AD  
Decision 
Average  
Duty(a) 
(%) Defendants 
1997 Fax machines 1 3220 D 1998 43 China, Japan, S-Korea, Malaysia,  
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand 
 Potassium permanganate 1 2413 D 1998 21 India, Ukraine 
 Polysulphide polymers 1 2417 D 1998 13 USA 
 Synthetic fibre ropes 4 1752 D 1998 82 India 
 Monosodium glutamate 1 2441 T 1998 0 Brazil, USA, Vietnam 
 Cotton fabrics 15 1720 T 1998 0 China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey 
 Strips of iron or non-alloy steel 4 2732 T 1998 0 Russia 
 Synthetic fibre ropes 4 1752 T 1998 0 S-Korea 
 Unwrought magnesium 2 2745 D 1998 32 China 
 Stainless steel bright bars 4 2731 D 1998 25 India 
 Thiourea dioxide 2 2414 T 1998 0 China 
 Hardboard 10 2020 D/U 1999 16 Japan, Korea, Malaysia, China, Taiwan 
 
Bicycles 2 3542 D 1999 18 Brazil, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,  
Lithuania, Poland, Russia 
 
Electrolytic alumin.  
Capacitators 
3 3210 T 1999 0 Taiwan 
 Woven glass fibre 1 1720 T 1998 0 USA, Thailand 
1998 Polypropylene binder 1 1752 D /U 1999 26 Japan 
 Steel stranded rope & cables 1 2873 D/U 1999 45 Poland, Czech. Republic, Hungary 
 Stainless steel wire 4 2734 D/U 1999 56 China, India, South Africa, Ukraine 
 Steel stranded rope & cables 1 2873 D/U 1999 44 India, Korea 
 Polyester  filament yarn 4 2470 T 1999 0 Hungary, Mexico, Poland 
 Stainless steel heavy plates 1 2710 T 1999 0 Korea, India 
 Seamless pipes and tubes 2 2722 D /U 2000 31 Slovenia, South Africa 
Source: Bown, Global Antidumping Database.  
(a) The average duty is the country wide duty that applies to “all other exporting producers”. Exporters that co-operate in the EU antidumping (AD) investigation often get a 
lower duty. 
  A price-undertaking (U) involves a voluntary price increase by the alleged dumpers to offset the injury to the import-competing industry. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics  
 Non-Initial Exporters Initial Exporters 
Operating revenue 
000€ 
5860 (23171) 15516 (35705) 
 
Employees 
In number of full-time equivalents 
41 (108) 92 (177) 
 
Labor productivity 
In 000€ 
52 (70) 57 (89) 
 
Tangible fixed assets 
In 000€ 
876 (4690) 2892 (9450) 
 
Foreign subsidiary dummy 0.02 (0.15) 0.094 (0.29) 
 
Source:  Amadeus, French firm-level data 
Notes:  1) standard deviation in brackets 
2) In the original data set, initial-exporters represent 25% of all firms, but when dropping those firms with missing observations on operating revenue and employment, the number of initial exporters rises to 33%, 
which means that especially small non-exporters do not report all variables. 
 3) Initial Exporter is defined as a firm exporting in the year of the antidumping case initiation 
 
Table 3: Antidumping Protection and the Intensive Margin of Exports 
 
 
(1) 
EXPORT  
Turnover of 
Initial Exporters 
 
 
(2) 
EXPORT 
Turnover of 
Global firms 
 
(3) 
EXPORT  
Turnover of 
global firms with only  
affiliates outside the EU 
 
(4) 
EXPORT 
Turnover of 
non-Global firms 
 
 
AD-Effect -0.077*** 
(0.035) 
-0.166** 
(0.09) 
-0.248** 
(0.125) 
-0.070** 
(0.037) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N° Obs. 7,053 546 305 6,347 
Source: Amadeus, French firm-level data 
Notes:   1) Export Turnover is the log of real export turnover 
2) standard errors in brackets. 
2) */**/*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively 
3) Control group are frims in Termination firms 
4) AD_EFFECT takes a value of 0 before Antidumping protection and a value of 1 for the 5 years after protection but only for the protected firms 
5) Initial_Exporter are firms that are exporting in the year of case initiation.  ”Global firms” are those firms that have foreign subsidiaries   
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Table 4: The Effect of AD protection on Domestic Sales 
 Initial_Exporters Non-Exporters 
 (1) 
All Initial  
Exporters 
(2) 
Global firms 
(3) 
Non-Global  
(4) 
Non-exporters 
(5)  
Global firms 
(6)  
Non-Global  
AD-Effect -0.044*** 
(0.018) 
-0.228*** 
(0.080) 
-0.030** 
(0.018) 
0.050*** 
(0.016) 
0.08 
(0.126) 
0.049*** 
(0.164) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes 
N° Obs. 6893 546 6,347 15,180 282 14,898 
Source: Amadeus, French firm-level data 
Notes:  
1) Domestic sales is the log or real domestic sales 
2) Standard errors in brackets 
3) */**/*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively 
4) Control group in the dif-in-difs are Termination firms 
5) Initial_Exporter is an exporter in the year of case initiation 
6) Global firms” are those firms that have foreign subsidiaries   
 
Table 5: Antidumping Protection and the Extensive Margin. 
 (1) 
Start to export 
(2) 
Start to export 
(3) 
Quit to export 
(4) 
Quit to export 
AD-effect 0.030*** 
(0.006) 
0.024** 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
Ever_Protection -0.034*** 
(0.004) 
-0.033*** 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Trend 0.008*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0029** 
(0.0016) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.001** 
(0.0008) 
Initial productivity - 0.0006 
(0.006) 
- -0.005* 
(0.003) 
Log likelihood -3045 -445 -1040 -489 
# observations 15,188 2,577 8,237 4,728 
Source: Amadeus, French firm-level data 
Notes: 
1) The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a dummy taking a value of 0 for a non-exporting firm in the years it does not export and a value of 1 for an exporting firm in exporting years 
2) The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is a dummy taking a value of 0 in the years if the firm is an initial exporter and a value of 1 in the years exporting stops 
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Table 6: Antidumping Protection and Intra- versus Extra EU Product level Exports 
 
 Intra-EU Exports Extra-EU Exports 
 
 Volume Prices Volume Prices 
AD-EFFECT -0.284** 
(0.133) 
- -0.037 
(0.087) 
- -0.369*** 
(0.1215) 
- 0.003 
(0.052) 
- 
AD-EFFECT x year1  -0.104 
(0.253) 
 -0.017 
(0.166) 
 -0.506*** 
(0.235) 
 0.021 
(0.099) 
AD-EFFECT x year 2  -0.282 
(0.232) 
 -0.061 
(0.152) 
 -0.344* 
(0.215) 
 -0.137* 
(0.092) 
AD-Effect x year 3  -0.250 
(0.238) 
 0.053 
(0.156) 
 -0.298* 
(0.220) 
 -0.034 
(0.094) 
AD-EFFECT x year 4  -0.339 
(0.237) 
 0.0147 
(0.155) 
 -0.243 
(0.211) 
 0.0006 
(0.092) 
AD-EFFECT x year 5  -0.325 
(0.228) 
 0.018 
(0.150) 
 -0.177 
(0.211) 
 -0.064 
(0.081) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# observations 690 690 690 690 724 724 724 724 
Source, EUROSTAT trade statistics, product-level data at 8 digit CN level 
Notes: (1) Products in Termination cases serve as a control group in the dif-in-dif regressions reported in the Table; (2) standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 7: Antidumping Protection and Product level Exports to and Imports from targeted countries 
 
 
 Exports to target countries  Imports from target countries 
 
 Volumes Prices Volumes Prices 
 
AD-effect -0.666** 
(0.286) 
 0.131 
(0.137) 
 -0.801*** 
(0.211) 
 0.046 
(0.074) 
- 
AD-EFFECT x year1 - -1.05** 
(0.272) 
- 0.269 
(0.272) 
- -0.747** 
(0.39) 
 -0.050 
(0.137) 
AD-EFFECT x year 2 - -0.475 
(0.483) 
- -0.150 
(0.230) 
- -0.700** 
(0.38) 
- 0.061 
(0.132) 
AD-Effect x year 3 - -0.738* 
(0.458) 
- 0.046 
(0.218) 
- -1.13** 
(0.367) 
- 0.094 
(0.128) 
AD-EFFECT x year 4 - -0.417 
(0.481) 
- 0.393* 
(0.22) 
- -1.261*** 
(0.390) 
- 0.432** 
(0.136) 
AD-EFFECT x year 5 - -0.656 
(0.504) 
- 0.109 
(0.240) 
- -0.540* 
(0.373) 
- -0.165 
(0.130) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Product Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# observations 363 363 363 363 506 506 506 506 
 
Source: EUROSTAT trade statistics, product- level trade data at 8 digit CN level 
Note: the estimates above involve export and import volumes to target countries as reported in last column of Table 1 on a case-by-case basis  
where we only consider target countries outside the EU. 
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Table 8: Are Exporters more Productive? 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Log of real Labor  
productivity 
Log of real Labor  
productivity 
Explanatory Variables:   
Capital Intensity ratio 0.14*** 
(0.0085) 
0.075*** 
(0.006) 
 
Exporter_status 0.072*** 
(0.015) 
0.022** 
(0.12) 
 
Year Dummies YES YES 
 
Sector Fixed effects YES - 
 
Firm fixed effects - YES 
 
N° of Observations 12246 12246 
Source: AMADEUS, French firm-level data 
Notes: 1) Export_status takes a value of 1 in case the firm ever exports during the period of analysis  
2) Capital Intensity Ratio is the log of Fixed Tangible Assets over Employment  
3) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Antidumping Protection and the Productivity of Exporters 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Dependent variable log labor  
productivity 
log labor  
productivity 
TFP_OLS TFP_OP 
Capital intensity 0.074*** 
(0.006) 
0.074*** 
(0.006) 
- - 
AD_EFFECT 0.021** 
(0.012) 
0.061*** 
(0.017) 
0.038*** 
(0.009) 
0.039*** 
(0.009) 
AD_EFFECT x  
Initial_Exporter 
- -0.072*** 
(0.021) 
-0.064*** 
(0.012) 
-0.066*** 
(0.012) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
N° Observations 12246 12246 14664 14664 
Source: AMADEUS, French firm-level data 
Notes: 1) Capital Intensity Ratio is the log of Fixed Tangible Assets over Employment  
2) Robust standard errors 
3) Clustering for firm-level observations
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Table 10: Robustness Checks: Dependent variable TFP (Olley-Pakes) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Second  
Differences 
Third  
Differences
First Differences 
(using export share  
instead) 
Bertrand  
approach 
AD_EFFECT 0.028*** 
(0.013) 
0.033** 
(0.016) 
0.024*** 
(0.009) 
0.076*** 
(0.019) 
 
AD_EFFECT x 
Initial_Exporter 
-0.031** 
(0.016) 
-0.033** 
(0.019) 
-0.036*** 
(0.021) 
-0.058*** 
(0.022) 
 
Year Dummies yes yes yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
N°  Obs 7062 4988 9984 6021 
 
Source: AMADEUS, French firm-level data
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